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Pirates and Privateers: 
Managing the Indian 
Ocean’s Private Security 
Boom 
E x e c u t i v e  s u m m a r y  
The fight against Somali-based pirates is becoming a private battle as 
global defence cuts reduce naval counter-piracy deployments. Because 
governments have struggled to contain the spread of piracy in the 
Indian Ocean, shipping companies have turned to private military 
security companies to guarantee the safety of their crews and cargo. 
Private armed teams have proliferated on commercial shipping and 
several private armed vessels are operating in the region. Meanwhile, 
some governments are hiring out their own national militaries as 
security guards onboard ships.  
However, this private counter-piracy boom is creating fresh problems. 
Already, shootings at sea have led to international disputes and 
accidental confrontations. And murky legal and consular difficulties 
loom. There is a legitimate role for private companies in fighting 
piracy. But the challenge for governments will be to recapture the 
policy agenda and define the limits of what that role is before it leads 
to new kinds of trouble on the high seas. 
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Introduction 
 
Concerns about Somali-based piracy are 
combining with global defence cuts to fuel a 
boom in the use of private military security 
companies (PMSCs) in the Indian Ocean. Over 
140 recently launched PMSCs employ at least 
2700 armed contractors onboard commercial 
ships, with more than a quarter of commercial 
ships now using armed security onboard. 1 A 
new development is the deployment of private 
armed patrol boats, essentially private navies 
operating in a legal vacuum. Additionally, there 
are plans for more than 2000 European 
military personnel to be privately hired to 
shipping as vessel protection detachments.  One 
way or another, the counter-piracy fight is 
becoming a private one.  
 
Initial evidence suggests that private armed 
contractors have been effective in reducing 
successful pirate attacks upon shipping. Piracy 
attacks have decreased by 60 per cent thus far 
in 2012, and though it is too soon to 
conclusively establish why, some experts 
believe this is because of the use of private 
armed guards.2 In recent months 9 out of 10 
failed attacks by pirates on merchant ships 
were repelled by armed PMSCs.3 Efficiently 
regulated PMSCs represent a cost-effective 
counter-piracy solution for shipping companies 
and allow navies to incur less cost operating 
counter-piracy flotillas.  
 
However, there have also been problems. 
Though this boom is only 18 months old, 
already private contractors and vessel 
protection detachments have shot and killed 
suspected pirates. In February, Italian Marines 
onboard an Italian oil tanker killed two 
fishermen they suspected of piracy in waters off 
India. They now await trial for murder amidst 
worsened diplomatic relations between India 
and Italy.  
 
All of this has troubling implications. 
Coordination with navies is difficult and 
accidental confrontations between different 
counter-piracy forces are possible. Industry 
regulation may be difficult and dispute 
resolution fractious. The potential for a mini-
arms race between pirates and PMSCs is very 
real. And private counter-piracy forces are 
already changing the way pirates operate. 
 
Government policy, international organisations 
and international law have failed to keep pace 
with the rapid changes happening in the 
shipping and maritime private security 
industries. Instead they are relying on industry 
self-regulation, goodwill, and a degree of luck 
to manage the new presence of so many armed 
players in the Indian Ocean. 
 
A fresh set of problems, however, is likely to 
develop from the use of vessel protection 
detachments – a phenomenon that has little 
recent parallel on land.  This practice will 
involve militaries accepting new kinds of risk 
and could well distort traditional civil-military 
distinctions.  
 
This Lowy Institute Analysis examines the 
origins, characteristics, problems and likely 
trajectory of the private security boom in the 
Indian Ocean. It concludes with some 
preliminary policy recommendations for 
governments and identifies areas warranting 
further research. 
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Surging Somali piracy, sparse resources, 
scant resolve 
 
After foreign forces withdrew from Somalia in 
the mid 1990s, worsening security and 
economic conditions led to an increase in 
piracy in the Indian Ocean. Somali-based 
pirates were able to attack passing shipping 
traffic with impunity and began to take ships 
and crew hostage with increasing regularity. 
This grew into a global security challenge 
because the area at risk from Somali piracy sits 
astride the world’s second busiest trade route.4 
Since 2008, three UN Security Council 
Resolutions have addressed Somali piracy, 
providing a legal basis for anti-piracy patrols 
and escorts involving the navies of most of the 
world’s major maritime powers. Yet by and 
large the pirates have not been deterred. They 
have become increasingly brazen, with piracy 
incidents increasing between 2008 and 2011.5 
The piracy business model has been highly 
successful; last year pirates secured total 
ransoms of US$146m for hijacked ships and 
crew. The recovery of the shipping industry 
since the 2008 global financial crisis has also 
presented more opportunity for pirates and 
their own industry has become highly 
sophisticated. Pirates hire currency specialists 
to count ransom drops and test for counterfeit 
notes.  Local Somali investors finance start-up 
piracy operations in return for ransom shares, 
and piracy funds have driven a Somali housing 
boom.6  
 
For reasons that are as yet unclear, the 
frequency of both attempted and successful 
hijackings has dropped significantly thus far in 
2012.7 One reason for the decline in Somali 
piracy may be the more frequent presence of 
PMSCs on Indian Ocean shipping. Certainly 
this perception pervades the shipping industry. 
But regardless of whether piracy continues to 
decrease or not, the utility of PMSCs at sea has 
been well established.    
 
The international military response to Somali 
piracy has been substantial. At any given time, 
three international maritime task forces 
contribute up to 40 warships and maritime 
patrol aircraft, and ten other national flotillas 
have operated in the piracy high-risk area.8 
Counter-piracy coordination has been 
remarkable given that is has involved a high 
degree of interaction between navies that do 
not commonly work together, including the 
Chinese, Japanese, Russian, Iranian, Pakistani, 
Indian, and United States navies.9 Monthly 
meetings coordinate, or at least deconflict, 
patrols by the different forces, and three liaison 
offices monitor shipping traffic, provide piracy 
intelligence, and coordinate incident response.10 
An Internationally Recommended Transit 
Corridor in the Gulf of Aden provides the 
maritime equivalent of a well-lit path where 
warships are pre-positioned to assist transiting 
shipping convoys.11 Yet, for all the shipping it 
has directly protected, one result of this 
traditional naval response has been for pirates 
to shift attacks further into the Indian Ocean. 
 
The problem of Somali piracy, now spread over 
8.3 million km2 of ocean, has become too big 
for naval forces to counter alone. Some 
estimates conclude that 83 coordinated 
warships with embarked helicopters, more than 
double the numbers currently deployed, would 
be needed to provide a 30-minute response time 
to any piracy incident in the high-risk area.12 
Even then, typical pirate attacks are over within 
30 minutes. In the words of one observer, the 
counter-piracy efforts of the world’s navies 
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have been akin to ‘a police car patrolling an 
area the size of France’.13 
 
Facing resource constraints, the European and 
US navies have shown little willingness to 
provide additional counter-piracy forces. 
Maintaining warships and aircraft in the Indian 
Ocean is expensive – annual operating costs 
alone for the major counter-piracy fleets are 
US$1.5bn.14 Salaries, logistical support, and 
wear and tear on warships and helicopters levy 
additional burdens on already strained defence 
budgets. The pressure on finite naval resources 
has also risen due to tensions elsewhere, 
including, for example, the Straits of Hormuz. 
European navies particularly are concerned 
about the impact of ongoing piracy operations 
on their defence budgets, and have either 
reduced their counter-piracy commitments or 
are looking to do so.15  
 
Counter-piracy operations provide limited 
deterrence, as prosecution of pirates is mostly 
unsuccessful. Competing jurisdictions and 
difficulties in obtaining evidence make 
prosecutions difficult – even within NATO 
there is no common legal framework for the 
arrest and transfer of pirates. Judicial capacity 
constraints in African countries are 
problematic. More than 1000 pirates await 
trial in 20 countries.16 Many navies simply 
release pirates after catching them. The US 
Navy has 71 pirates in semi-permanent 
detention on ships because there is no 
‘repeatable international process to bring them 
to justice’.17  
 
But the chief factor limiting international 
responses to piracy is an unwillingness to 
operate on land in Somalia – both to improve 
governance and development, but also to strike 
at ports and villages from which pirates 
operate. This is because of memories of 
previous failed interventions but also due to 
concerns about imperiling crews held hostage. 
The UN has refused six requests to blockade 
Somali seaports in the past two years.18 The 
European Union only mandated its naval force 
to strike at pirate safe havens this year and has 
done so only once.19  
 
 
Privateers into the breach 
 
The limitations on counter-piracy naval forces 
have not only allowed Somali piracy to 
continue, but have also created the conditions 
for a private security response. The use of 
PMSCs has become prolific across the shipping 
industry. The Volvo Ocean race now uses them 
to secure its $10m yachts on their African coast 
transit.20 Encounters between pirates and 
privateers are becoming increasingly common. 
One company reports over 90 encounters with 
pirates, 18 of which were resolved through the 
firing of shots.21 
 
Maritime PMSCs have greatly expanded their 
operations protecting commercial shipping in 
the Indian Ocean in the past 18 months. Over 
140 firms operate in the region, the bulk of 
those established last year.22 No less than 26 
per cent of civilian ships transiting the Gulf of 
Aden officially declare the use of armed PMSCs 
onboard.23 Anecdotal reports suggest that a 
much larger proportion of ships, perhaps half, 
are carrying such teams. Up to 18 private ships 
operate as floating armouries in international 
waters – allowing contractors to arm 
themselves for transits and sidestep arms 
trafficking regulations enforced in ports. 24 
 
  
Page 6 
A n a l y s i s  
Pirates and Privateers 
It is difficult to determine how many individual 
private security contractors are currently 
working in the Indian Ocean, as there is no 
central registry for their licensing or 
qualification. Based on the number of ships 
officially reporting the use of armed teams, and 
assuming a minimum team size of four, it is 
likely at least 2700 armed guards are operating 
onboard commercial ships.25 And this number 
is increasing. A large British PMSC increased 
contractor employment by 150 per cent last 
year and plans to employ a total of 1000 this 
year.26 Hundreds more staff are employed 
providing support services for the industry on 
land. Most contractors are British or American; 
however, contractors from Australia and New 
Zealand are common too because their military 
training is interoperable with the US and UK. 
 
Maritime PMSCs are experiencing high annual 
revenue growth in counter-piracy and are 
signing larger contracts.27 Listed security group 
G4S last year flagged piracy-related maritime 
security as a ‘big commercial opportunity’. 28 
Some firms have been successful in raising tens 
of millions of dollars from investors to finance 
private navies.29 The boom shows no signs of 
slowing and firms surveyed for this analysis are 
optimistic about growth prospects and hiring 
increases in the next 12 months.  
 
 
Behind the boom: commercial imperatives 
and policy drift  
 
The commercial imperatives of the shipping 
industry and lack of government leadership 
have fuelled the private counter-piracy boom. 
Until May last year, the shipping industry did 
not condone the use of armed PMSCs on ships. 
Typical concerns about their use included: the 
safety risk to ships’ crews; collateral damage 
risk to ships; the potential to provoke 
escalation by pirates; liability and insurance 
issues in the case of death or injury; and the 
legal complexities of employing potentially 
lethal force at sea.30 Since then all major 
shipping industry groups have accepted that 
PMSCs are a key, if perhaps temporary, 
component of the global response to piracy.  
 
The policy change occurred when industry 
groups belatedly accepted that many shipping 
companies were using PMSCs. Shipping 
companies began to demand policy guidance 
from governments and insurers on the legality 
of using armed teams. Two key factors drove 
the shift to armed PMSCs. First, the rising costs 
of insurance. Ships carry multiple insurance 
policies and piracy risk is largely covered by 
war risk premiums.31 Since 2008 the Lloyd’s 
Joint War Committee, a coordinating body of 
Lloyds London underwriters, has designated 
Indian Ocean piracy regions as a ‘war-risk 
zone’, increasing insurance premiums for ships 
that transit.32 Concurrently, underwriters have 
offered to reduce premiums for ships that hire 
private security and take out separate kidnap 
and ransom insurance.33 In some cases, 
underwriters will not issue kidnap and ransom 
insurance unless a ship hires armed guards.34  
 
The second factor was the escalating cost of 
capture by pirates. The average ransom is now 
$4.58m and captured ships and crew are held 
for an average 158 days. Shipping companies 
lose millions in foregone chartering income 
while their ship is held to ransom. They also 
incur high costs in hiring specialist ransom 
negotiators, ransom drop experts, and support 
for crews once released. Hiring a PMSC for 
$50, 000 is a comparatively small price to pay 
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to substantially reduce these costs.35  Some 
ships can recoup this cost simple by slowing 
their speed through pirate-infested areas and 
saving on fuel.36 
 
The response of governments to the use of 
armed PMSCs has largely been reactive. 
Although US and UK counter-piracy 
commanders have sometimes articulated a role 
for PMSCs, particularly after the 2009 defence 
of the ship Maersk Alabama by a private armed 
team, their employment was initially illegal in 
most countries.37 The UK government flagged 
that it would reconsider the ban after industry 
guidelines on maritime PMSCS were released in 
May 2011, and changed its policy to allow 
their use five months later.38 The US 
government began encouraging the use of 
armed PMSCs in November 2011, circulating 
talking points on their utility to diplomatic 
posts.39 Ten other major shipping states have 
subsequently amended policy to allow private 
armed guards on shipping and several more are 
considering similar changes.40  
 
 
How maritime PMSCs operate 
 
Maritime PMSCs provide two types of service: 
armed contractors and armed convoy escort 
vessels. Contractors are typically ex-Navy 
personnel with shipping industry-accredited 
safety and training qualifications, and work in 
teams of 3-6.41 Maritime PMSCs offer a full 
suite of counter-piracy services, including 
hardening of vessels in accordance with 
industry standards, crew counter-piracy 
training, and preparation of onboard citadels 
(panic rooms used during a pirate attack). 
Contractors embark with body armour, 
medical kits, satellite communications, night-
vision equipment and weapons (usually small 
arms such as AK47s and RPK light machine 
guns).42 Costs for PMSCs and their contractors 
vary greatly. Individual contractors earn up to 
$500 per day and companies can charge out 
contractors for $1000 per day.43 A typical 
contractor will work on contract for up to one 
year and complete some pre-deployment 
training. 
 
New service industries are emerging to support 
the needs of private armed teams. Shipping 
logistics agencies facilitate the movement of 
personnel, weapons, and equipment on and off 
ships. Companies collect piracy intelligence, 
and some run operations rooms tracking armed 
teams and providing constant piracy updates. 
Some PMSCs subcontract to medical 
evacuation companies and a small number 
maintain in-house medical evacuation services 
for their contractors. New companies provide 
bespoke insurance for armed teams, advise 
shipping industry clients on how to vet PMSCs, 
and offer certification for individual 
contractors.44 A new online marketplace 
connects armed teams offloaded due to sudden 
shipping schedule changes with other ships 
seeking their services at short notice.45 
 
PMSCs embark from ports near the Gulf of 
Aden, including Port Djibouti, Salalah, Muscat, 
and Dar-Es-Salaam. A common port for 
disembarkation is Galle in southern Sri Lanka, 
an average 13 days passage from the Suez 
Canal and close to international shipping 
routes.46 New support industries service armed 
teams there. Sri Lankan companies offer ‘battle 
hardened Sri Lankan Sea Marshals’ for hire, 
provide transport for teams boarding ships, and 
logistical support for the movement of weapons 
and ammunition.47 The Sri Lankan government 
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provides comprehensive support for PMSCs 
and the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence licenses 
them to store equipment and weapons in 
bonded warehouses within naval bases.48  
 
A majority of companies surveyed for this 
project procure their weapons in Western 
Europe and all reported complying with flag 
state regulations on the carriage of firearms. 
However, ‘flag of convenience’ states provide 
limited inspection regimes, and compliance 
with the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations is complicated and expensive for 
maritime PMSCs. Governments require 
companies to register movement of weapons 
through their ports and often refuse permission 
to private companies.  
 
Some PMSCs sidestep regulations by using their 
own floating armoury ships on the high seas.49 
This allows their contractors to embark on 
client ships in port, and pick up their weapons 
and equipment during a rendezvous outside of 
territorial waters. Some companies and 
contractors acquire weapons illegally and 
simply dispose of them overboard at the end of 
a transit. A contractor explains: 
 
Given that you can get an AK-47 for about 
$200 in most big African towns … and it 
costs about $1,000 per weapon to do it 
legally, and then there’s all the forms, 
coastguard licences etc, a lot of people think 
it’s easier to buy weapons illegally and drop 
them down to Davy Jones’s locker when 
you get out of the danger area.50  
 
 
 
 
Private patrol boats - seaborne vigilantes? 
 
Whilst armed guards on ships are largely a 
passive and defensive counter-piracy measure, 
private armed patrol boats provide a more 
aggressive method of protecting shipping. At 
least 40 private armed patrol boats have been, 
are, or will soon be operating in the Indian 
Ocean.51 They operate by establishing exclusion 
zones around the client ship and challenging 
suspicious boats that approach them. Some 
firms offer boarding teams on these escort 
vessels, with team members who are ‘well 
versed in waterborne operations and have 
experience in boarding/ counter boarding drills, 
waterborne interdiction and 
maritime/amphibious warfare’.52 Private armed 
patrol boats are attractive to shipping 
companies because they do not require 
weapons-carriage on company ships and thus 
do not compromise their right to innocent 
passage through territorial waters.53 Also, any 
consequences of firing weapons are outsourced 
to the captain of the private armed patrol 
boat.54  
 
Such private navies are not new; they briefly 
operated in the Malacca Straits seven years ago 
and the notorious PMSC Blackwater 
unsuccessfully attempted a similar Indian 
Ocean venture in 2009.55 Nor have they been 
particularly profitable in the past. But 
ambitious plans to raise new private fleets in 
the Indian Ocean are attracting corporate 
heavyweights and financing.56 One venture 
raised US$40m in the past year. Another 
chaired by the CEO of global commodities 
trader Glencore is fitting out three boats in 
Singapore, which will carry 20 crew, 40 armed 
contractors, and utilise drones and helicopters 
to fight pirates.57 The most common weapon 
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employed on these boats is the 50-calibre heavy 
machine gun, able to fire at vessels more than a 
nautical mile away. 
 
The status of private armed patrol boats under 
international law is unclear; they could 
themselves even be defined as pirates because 
they use aggressive force on the high seas 
without government authority.58 Policy 
discussions on the boom in private counter-
piracy have largely ducked the issue of private 
navies. As more vessels operate in the Indian 
Ocean, this will become a pressing issue. Some 
private armed patrol boat operators surveyed 
for this analysis have stated they would be 
willing to respond to non-client ships under 
attack. If unchecked, these fleets could be more 
akin to seaborne vigilantes than to private 
incarnations of naval counter-piracy forces. 
 
 
Public privateers: national militaries for 
hire 
 
For the past six months, two Italian marines 
have been held in a southern Indian jail 
awaiting trial for murder. Their arrest, for 
shooting two Indian fishermen they suspected 
of piracy whilst onboard the Italian ship Enrica 
Lexie, highlighted a concerning parallel 
development to the private security boom. 
Because of shipping company demands for 
armed teams and shrinking defence budgets, 
governments are now privately hiring out their 
soldiers to provide security onboard 
commercial ships. Such privately hired military 
teams are known as vessel protection 
detachments, or VPDs. Their role has been 
explained as ‘self defence, liaison with law 
enforcement agencies, training and security 
vetting of personnel, the use of weapons, 
communications with sovereign authorities, 
record-taking and evidence’.59 Such teams have 
also been commonly offered by African nations 
to assist companies operating in their territorial 
waters.60 The Russian Navy has employed them 
occasionally since 2009, and since 2010 
European naval forces have sporadically 
offered VPDs to cruise liners and World Food 
Program ships in the piracy high-risk area.61 
However, the use of VPDs by European naval 
forces has soared in the past 18 months. By the 
end of next year almost 2000 naval personnel 
may be operating in the Indian Ocean under 
private hire to protect commercial interests. 
 
The Netherlands, France, Spain, Belgium, and 
Italy all offer private shipping companies the 
opportunity to hire VPDs for use during 
transits of the Indian Ocean. Other countries 
are considering whether they should do the 
same. Indonesia, with over 76, 000 citizens 
employed as crew at sea, is seriously 
considering offering VPDs, partly in order to 
assuage concerns about the safety of its 
seafarers.62 The services are available to ships 
registered in each nation, or to companies 
substantially controlled by each nation’s 
citizens. The shipping industry has voiced a 
strong preference for VPDs to conduct 
shipboard counter-piracy, rather than 
contractors from maritime PMSCs.63 This is 
largely based on the logic that national 
militaries can move weapons and personnel 
through transit ports more easily, and that 
military personnel have better protection from 
prosecution, and more certain legal status, than 
private contractors.  
 
The Dutch military commenced offering VPDs 
last year, asserting a constitutional imperative 
to protect their citizens operating at sea. Dutch 
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shipping companies have been banned from 
using armed PMSCs onboard their ships due to 
Dutch government concerns that this would 
undermine the state’s monopoly on the use of 
force. An early VPD deployment placed 24 
military personnel and medical staff onboard 
and the cost of the military team was borne 
largely by the private shipping company.64 So 
far, the Dutch have deployed 26 VPD missions 
and plan on deploying 100 teams with ten 
personnel each this year, and 175 next year.65 
Total operating costs for Dutch teams are 
estimated at US$29m this year, of which 
shipping companies are expected to pay 
approximately half.66 Transit points for Dutch 
VPDs include Singapore, Malta, Bahrain, 
Sharjah, Durban, and Mauritius.67 In most 
locations, Dutch embassy staff supervise 
embarkation and disembarkation, and in 
February an agreement was signed to store 
weapons and equipment for commercial 
shipping transits on a Singapore Armed Forces 
airbase.68  
 
There are a number of problems associated 
with the use of vessel protection detachments, 
not least of which is that they are often more 
expensive than private alternatives and often in 
short supply.69 VPDs are an explicit alignment 
of national military power with private 
commercial interests. When national militaries 
patrol the piracy high-risk area in warships, 
they are patrolling for the common good and 
able to respond to any vessel under attack. 
When military personnel embark upon an 
individual ship as a VPD, they are only able to 
provide protection to that particular ship and 
do not contribute to the wider counter-piracy 
fight. Certainly, placing marines on a private 
ship is cheaper than escorting it with a warship. 
But it makes separating state and commercial 
interests difficult. The use of national militaries 
as guards on board shipping also creates 
substantial ambiguity about their identity, and 
raises a raft of political and legal problems. 
Port officials may be unclear as to whether 
military detachments are fulfilling other 
functions, such as intelligence collection, when 
they enter port on a civilian ship. States may 
choose to treat civilian vessels carrying VPDs as 
warships instead, with wider implications for 
legal and diplomatic status.  
 
When militaries hire their personnel out as 
VPDs, they cede a degree of authority over 
them to the civilian ship captain and shipping 
company. In effect, VPDs have their 
movements dictated by shipping companies 
rather than governments, and are under the 
command of the civilian ship captain. This 
means the state may suffer the consequences of 
private decisions and opens up the possibility 
that a private ship might be perceived as an 
instrument of state policy. What happens to the 
ship will have direct implications for the 
national government. In the Enrica Lexie case, 
the actions of Italian marines onboard a private 
Italian ship created diplomatic furor. The 
Italian ambassador to India was recalled to 
Rome, and the incident has robbed Italy of any 
political capital it may have had in its wider 
relationship with India for the foreseeable 
future. It is becoming clear that many 
governments have not fully considered the 
consequences of hiring VPDs to shipping 
companies.  
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Concluding judgments and 
recommendations 
 
The use of maritime PMSCs to guard against 
the piracy threat seems to have been effective, 
yet the practice is not without risks.  The boom 
in PMSCs responding to the piracy threat in the 
Indian Ocean raises serious questions about the 
quality of the contractors. The shipping 
industry has already acknowledged ‘significant 
competence and quality variations…across the 
spectrum of contractors’.70 The legal status of 
armed PMSCs and, in particular, private armed 
patrol boats, is murky. The proliferation of 
PMSCs seems already to have contributed to 
breaches of international conventions on the 
movement of weapons.  It is extremely difficult 
to prosecute illegal behaviour by private 
contractors or the companies that support them 
because their legal status is unclear and there 
are so many overlapping jurisdictional issues 
associated with their use. In particular, the 
possibility of private armed patrol boats 
intercepting and perhaps boarding other 
civilian vessels raises significant legal questions, 
and there is significant potential for accidental 
confrontations at sea. 
 
Disputes arising from contentious and 
potentially lethal confrontations between 
PMSCs and pirates are likely. Dispute 
resolution in the shipping industry is difficult 
enough because of its complexity and 
intersecting national interests.  As one 
commentator has noted ‘A ship [may be] built 
in Japan, owned by a brass-plate company in 
Malta, controlled by an Italian, managed by a 
company in Cyprus, chartered by the French, 
skippered by a Norwegian, crewed by Indians, 
registered in Panama, financed by a British 
bank, carrying a cargo owned by a 
multinational oil company’.71 Contractors 
involved in shooting incidents, or detained by 
port states for illegal carriage of weapons, 
create consular and political difficulties for 
their home states. 
 
The private hiring of national military 
personnel (VPDs) is potentially even more 
problematic, raising a range of legal and 
political questions. For example, by ceding 
some authority for military personnel to 
shipping companies, national militaries risk 
becoming embroiled in disputes beyond their 
control.  In these disputes the state that has 
hired out its military personnel might 
ultimately be held responsible for their actions.  
At the very least, this has the potential to do 
serious damage to national reputations and to 
cause serious diplomatic incidents. An incident 
at sea, or in a port, involving a VPD could 
easily entangle several governments in serious 
legal and political disputes.  
 
Most governments and shipping industry 
associations seem to assume that the use of 
PMSCs will be temporary. But it is far from 
clear that the current decline in pirate attacks in 
the Indian Ocean will be permanent.  And 
given the apparently positive impact of PMSCs 
in the Somali case their use is likely to become 
more common. Governments and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
need to accept that armed PMSCs have a 
legitimate and probably increasing, long-term 
role in the counter-piracy fight and act 
therefore to recapture leadership of the policy 
and regulatory agenda related to their use. 
 
Greater regulation 
As far as the regulatory agenda goes, the IMO 
and governments should build on a number of 
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initiatives that already exist to regulate the 
private security industry. Originally devised to 
cover the use of private forces on land, the 
International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers has been an excellent 
tool for bringing together private companies, 
international organisations, governments and 
NGOs.72 The Code provides advice on the 
responsibilities of companies, as well as advice 
on dispute resolution and jurisdictional issues. 
It is developing protocols for accreditation of 
members through a regime of inspections and 
site visits. Though this will be difficult to 
implement at sea, the cooperative discussion on 
maritime PMSCs in this forum is productive 
and promising.73 Regional organisations, such 
as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, should 
deepen discussions on maritime PMSCs and the 
need for greater government oversight. 
 
Several industry associations are being formed 
to self-regulate PMSCs at sea, one of which is 
developing comprehensive guidance on 
contractor rules of engagement.74 International 
standards are also in development for the 
maritime security industry.75 Self-regulation 
could help to clearly define the risks of 
employing cheaper, poorly trained forces, and 
make sanctions from the insurance industry 
more readily available. That said, despite the 
promising progress of industry self-regulation, 
there will still be a role for national 
governments and the IMO in regulating 
maritime PMSCs. The main challenge for 
policy-makers will be wading through the 
‘colossal’ legal complexities of private counter-
piracy forces and the lack of a presumptive 
jurisdiction in which to resolve any disputes 
arising from their use.76 
 
Countries whose nationals are heavily 
represented among maritime PMSCs need to 
invest greater effort in tracking their citizens 
employed in the private maritime security 
industry. Most contractors in the industry are 
former military personnel, and national 
governments have some responsibility for how 
the taxpayer-funded military skills of these 
personnel are used – even when they leave the 
military.  One way to begin addressing this risk 
is to require former military personnel to 
register their overseas employment in the 
security industry.77 
 
There are also some aspects of the private 
counter-piracy effort that should be actively 
discouraged.  In particular, as already noted 
there are several troubling aspects about the use 
of private armed patrol boats. At the very least, 
governments need to closely monitor the 
development of these fleets.  Arguably, they 
should actively discourage their use where 
possible, and establish disincentives for 
national citizens and registered vessels that seek 
to procure private armed patrol boat services. 
The IMO should show greater leadership on 
the issue of private armed patrol boats. 
 
Governments and the International Maritime 
Organization also need to resolve the 
ambiguities surrounding the use of national 
militaries onboard commercial shipping 
(VPDs), and in the interim should be cautious 
about their use. Without an agreed 
international legal framework to resolve 
disputes involving VPDS, and with limited 
visibility of where and how such teams are 
operating, the potential for legal and political 
disputes between countries is substantial. 
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Develop practical coordination between naval 
and private counter-piracy forces 
Beyond better regulations of PMSCs there is 
also a need for greater coordination.  
Coordination between navies and privateers 
has generally been casual, but this should now 
be made more formal. Maritime PMSCs can 
help navies develop maritime situational 
awareness in the piracy high-risk area, and 
navies could share selected intelligence with 
PMSCs to help them assess the risks of certain 
transits. Navies could also facilitate access to 
military communications for vetted PMSCs.78 
Close information sharing will be necessary to 
monitor how pirates respond to the presence of 
armed security teams onboard shipping, and to 
prevent an arms race between such teams and 
pirates. Greater information sharing and 
coordination could also encourage PMSCs to 
more diligently report confrontations with 
pirates. Additionally, as the presence of 
maritime PMSCs becomes more common in the 
high-risk area, mistaken identification and 
friendly fire confrontations become a greater 
risk. Already, there have been occasions when 
warships attached to coalition military forces 
have mistaken private contractors for pirates.79 
Such episodes could have fatal consequences as 
well as major diplomatic repercussions. Tighter 
information-sharing is needed so that navies 
know when and where to expect the presence 
of private counter-piracy forces. 
 
The United Kingdom is the natural locus for 
policy leadership on privateers 
Because the IMO has been overly cautious thus 
far in approaching the issue of maritime 
PMSCs, the responsibility for policy leadership 
has largely fallen on the United Kingdom. The 
UK is a natural locus for both counter-piracy 
and maritime PMSC regulatory initiatives. 
Almost one-third of piracy ransoms paid last 
year flowed through the UK and the majority 
of maritime insurers and PMSCs are based in 
London. The UK government-initiated Security 
in Complex Environments Group, a special-
interest group formed from PMSCs, is working 
with government to establish national 
accreditation schemes and provides a 
mechanism for dialogue on PMSC issues.80 The 
UK is also well positioned to coordinate 
reporting and naval interactions with private 
armed teams:  two major counter-piracy 
flotillas are commanded form London, and the 
UK Maritime Trade Office already performs a 
coordination role in the high-risk area. The UK 
government has discussed maritime PMSCs at 
the highest levels, coordinated working groups 
with industry, released interim guidance and 
guidelines for its own flag ships, and the UK 
Secretary of State for Transport recently 
concluded that ‘ultimately we need an 
international accreditation scheme for 
PMSCS’.81 The UK should lead the 
development of this accreditation scheme and 
develop a mechanism for standardising training 
and accrediting industry personnel. In 
consultation with the insurance and shipping 
industries, the UK government should develop 
a public register and reporting regime that 
includes a blacklist of substandard or illegal 
companies and sanctions for those who hire 
them. 
 
The boom in private security in the Indian 
Ocean has caught governments by surprise. So 
far the use of private armed guards seems to 
have been effective, although not without risk. 
There is a legitimate and long-term role for 
private companies to provide security at sea. 
But their use requires more regulation and 
coordination than we have seen thus far.  
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Annexure 
 
Policy drift: changing policies on private counter-piracy forces 
 
 
2010 • US National Defense Authorization Act recommends government embark armed security 
teams aboard US flagged vessels carrying US government cargo in high-risk areas.  
September 
2010 
• EUNAVFOR commander supports private sector patrol boat fleet to protect merchant 
shipping, European Community Shipowners' Association calls for vessel protection 
detachments. 
October 
2010 
• Norwegian tanker company Odfjell seeks permission from Norwegian and Singaporean 
authorities to arm crew and carry armed guards.  
February 
2011 
• International Chamber of Shipping announces a change of stance on private armed guards, 
recognising that they are being used extensively off Somalia.  
March 
2011 
• Norwegian Shipowners’ Mutual War Risks Insurance Association issues guidance on the 
selection of maritime PMSCs to its members. 
May 2011 • Industry guidelines for the use of maritime PMSCs released, noting the increase in maritime 
PMSCs, expressing concern about the quality of some contractors, and ruling that the use of 
PMSCs is a matter for individual ship operators. The guidelines state a preference for the use 
of military vessel protection detachments as armed guards over contractors.  
• 89th session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee releases Circulars 1405 and 1408 which 
incorporate the provisions of the May 2011 Industry Guidelines and normalise the use of 
private armed guards. 
June 2011 • Shipping company Dockwise warns the Netherlands it will sail its vessels under a different 
flag unless it is allowed to use private armed guards. 
• UK Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office announces a reconsideration of UK 
policy banning private armed guards on shipping. 
July 2011 • Swedish car shipper Wallenius Lines announces it is using private armed guards.  
August 
2011 
• Egyptian Ministry of Defence withdraws prohibition on the carriage of armed guards, 
weapons and ammunition on vessels transiting the Suez Canal and Egyptian territorial waters.  
August 
2011 
• German government announces it will consider changing its policy on private armed guards. 
• Indian Shipping Ministry releases Guidelines on deployment of armed security guards on 
merchant ships.  
September 
2011 
• IMO approves revised guidance for flag states, ship owners, ship operators, ship masters, and 
port and coastal states on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board 
ships in the high-risk area. 
• Spain announces that Spanish tuna vessels in the Indian Ocean will be fitted with heavy 
machine guns and crew trained in how to use them by the Spanish navy. 
October 
2011 
• UK government announces change in policy on the use of private armed guards on ships 
‘because there is no doubt that private armed security provides significant protection’. 
• International Chamber of Shipping cautions, ‘Private armed guards do not represent a long 
term solution. Rather their use actually signifies a failure on the part of the international 
community – and those governments with significant military forces – to ensure the security 
of maritime trade…the reality is they have ceded control of the Indian Ocean to pirates.’ 
November 
2011 
• US Department of State issues guidance encouraging ‘the responsible use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on merchant vessels transiting high-risk 
waters off the Horn of Africa.’ 
• UK Department of Transport releases Interim guidance to UK flagged shipping on the use of 
armed guards to defend against the threat of piracy in exceptional circumstances. 
January 
2012 
• Philippines changes its policy to allow private armed guards on shipping. 
February 
2012 
• At the London Conference on Somalia the UK Prime Minister declares, ‘it’s right for 
merchant ships to have armed guards on them.’ 
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